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ABSTRACT 
 
In the modern world, regulation is a necessity, especially on an international scale. 
PMSCs or Private Military Security Contractors are groups that are involved with 
militaries, and in conflict zones around the world.
1
 Due to their unique functions and 
place in international law, they essentially fall into a regulatory gap. PMSCs are non- 
state actors
2
, but perform a series of roles and functions historically associated with 
the state. They can be used in multitudes of situations and have even been recruited in 
the war against drugs.
3
 Some see military contractors as, or similar to mercenaries,
4
 
while others disagree. Many, if not most, PMSC personnel do not fit the criteria that 
comprise the definition of a mercenary
5
, as set forth by article 47 of Additional 
Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention.
6
 
The issue becomes how best to regulate PMSCs and their personnel. Two options for 
regulation appear to be the most efficient, first, Kristine Huskey's three phase plan 
which segments the phases of PMSC operations and regulates each in a different 
way
7
. Secondly, the option of categorization; labeling military contractors and 
regulating them based on the category they are placed in. Categorization is a 
possibility however PMSC personnel have a multitude of roles, and therefore have 
different responsibilities and regulations. One category that includes all roles and 
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responsibilities is that of a MNC, or multinational corporation. Labeling PMSCs as 
corporations, categorizes them as what they truly are, businesses. Profit and future 
business are what PMSCs strive for, and therefore a way to regulate them.
8
 Some 
PMSCs are not combat oriented
9
, and there fore it would be incorrect to lump all 
PMSCs in together. 
When analyzing the international regulation of multinational corporations, parallels to 
PMSCs begin to appear. Both operate internationally, and both have a goal of profit. 
By understanding the operations and regulations of MNCs the international 
community could potentially find a way to categorize and regulate PMSCs. Huskey's 
three phase theory, in combination with the multinational corporation label, is a novel 
system by which regulation, as well as responsibility can be placed. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Contemporary warfare has created need and use for new technologies and groups of 
professionals in the “theatre of war”. Modern military forces use outside advisers and 
personnel to aid in their operations and provide support functions.
10
 One of the most 
controversial and impactful groups involved with militaries throughout the world are 
Private Military Security Contractors, or PMSC’s. PMSC’s have really come into the 
public eye following their involvement in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, on behalf 
of the United States. However, amongst most people, little is known about PMSC’s 
and the ways in which they function during a time of war. PMSC’s are a new 
phenomenon, and function as non-state actors, and therefore can be problematic for 
the international community as a whole.
11
 In this paper I attempt to analyze the 
current ideas and opinions regarding PMSC’s and their functions during international 
conflicts. I plan to analyze the works of many scholars, including both the positive 
and negative aspects of the business of military contracting. I will also speak about 
the reasons many feel there needs to be a regulation of these contractors, as well as 
the standing of PMSC’s under international law. From there I hope to provide 
theoretical categories in which Military Contractors, both as individuals and groups, 
can fit; under international law. As the categories are listed, this paper will also 
analyze the effectiveness of regulating these PMSCs within the scope of each 
category. In addition there will be an analysis of international rules and regulations 
regarding multinational corporations. From there, I will contemplate the similarities of 
PMSCs and multinational corporations, and why this categorization may fit under 
international law. From there I will analyze how said regulating PMSCs as 
multinationals could work using Husky’s three phase theory. This paper is framed 
around the regulation of PMSCs, and an analysis of their regulation if categorized as 
multinational corporations. 
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II. Military contractors introduced 
 
Throughout history, non-military personnel were used to perform functions during 
times of war. It is well known that kings and rulers used foreign soldiers for combat 
during military campaigns,
12
 and that civilians sometimes performed functions for a 
military force.
13
 According to Sid Ellington “America has used civilians in non- 
combat roles in almost every American conflict”.14 However, in the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, America has been using military contractors to perform a variety of roles 
in support of the military forces. Since the war began, private military and security 
contractors or PMSCs have been used in functions ranging from “health care to 
combat support.”15So when did these PMSCs become so widely used? When speaking 
about America particularly, the department of defense “formalized the relationship 
between civilian contractors and the military forces”,16 since the invasion of Grenada. 
But it was during the 1990’s that the idea that the government could “outsource 
services to private contractors” really began to make waves.17 Also, following Dick 
Cheney’s rise to power and his inclusion of Donald Rumsfeld into the fray, there has 
been a drive, spearheaded by Rumsfeld, to privatize military functions.
18
 It was a 
drive to privatize all functions that were not “core war fighting functions.” 19Sid 
Ellington also states that the argument could be made that military contractors 
actually form the largest segment of what President Bush called his “coalition of the 
willing.”20 While America’s use of PMSC organizations is the central focus, in the 
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public eye, when speaking about private military contractors, it should be said that 
military contractors have been used in a variety of different countries for a variety of 
different reasons. In recent years PMSC’s have been used in the war against drugs in 
Mexico and Colombia.
21
 PMSC’s have also been used by the American government in 
counter terrorism efforts following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
22 In David Perry’s 
Blackwater vs. bin Laden: The Private Sector’s Role in American Counterterrorism, 
Perry states that military contractors are “the corporate evolution of the profession of 
mercenaries” 23 . While it is not necessarily true that military contractors are 
mercenaries, based on the international legal definition of a mercenary, it is interesting 
that the word “corporate” was used. PMSC’s no matter if they are mercenaries, or 
legal combatants are now functioning mainly as corporations,
24
 and this is how they 
conduct their business in a modern world. 
 
A. PMSCs definition and roles 
The first and most important fact about PMSC’s is that they are non- state actors, and 
thereby they are not held to the same “doctrines of international law”25 that states are. 
Without an official category to place them in, whether it be mercenaries, unlawful 
combatants, combatants or even corporations, the international community is not able 
to regulate them as easily, if at all. “The mechanisms of control and accountability 
have not adapted due to the novelty of the phenomenon and its constant 
evolution.”26Due to this evolution, international law is behind, and left trying to patch 
this gap. According to Nigel White “structural inadequacies in the evolution of 
international law, in regards to states and state based actors, is why PMSCs are not 
                                                                                                                                            
Security. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press., Horton, Scott, Kevin Lanigan, and Michael 
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24
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PMSCs, 31 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS233, 233, (2012). 
 
26
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regulated.”27 What has this gap in international law lead to? To quote Perret, “this 
privatization is the presence of a non-state actor allowed to use force in contexts 
where once only states were allowed to do so.”28 
PMSC personnel have a wide variety of contractual obligations and responsibilities. 
The easiest way to explain the multitude of functions served by PMSC personnel is to 
break them down into three categories that P.W. Singer has identified recently. These 
three categories are based on the services the PMSCs have performed for the U.S. 
military. The first category includes “military support firms that deliver 
‘supplementary military services... including logistics, intelligence, technical support, 
supply, and transportation’”. The second category covers “military consulting firms 
that supply ‘advisory and training services integral to the operation and restructuring 
of a client's armed forces’”. The third and final category “military provider firms that 
focus on the tactical environment by running active combat operations”29 are the most 
controversial contractors that are the stereotypical example in most people’s minds.  
These categories do provide us with a good idea of the variety of functions that PMSC 
personnel can provide. Many PMSC personnel may never carry weapons or see 
combat. This then leads us to the question, should we regulate PMSCs and their 
personnel? 
 
B. Regulation and purpose 
Military contractors, as a whole, seem to be viewed in a negative light in the eyes of 
many scholars and the public. But why is this? Many believe, PMSC personnel are 
joining conflicts in order to make money, in similar fashion to mercenaries. To believe 
a person would willingly put themselves in positions where they might have to kill, 
for money, is disturbing to many people. According to Sara Percy, at one point in 
PMSCs “combat services were simply too controversial and international distaste for 
the open provision of combat helped push Executive Outcomes and Sandline out of 
                                                 
27
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business.” 30  PMSC’s however, have many functions besides fighting in armed 
conflicts, and many of the conflicts they do participate in are important and can have a 
positive impact on the world. For example, military contractors are being used in the 
“war on drugs” 31 as stated above. This, to many, is a positive use of military 
contractors, and a good use of their skill and resources. In some cases PMSC 
companies avoided combat. For example Percy states, “Tim Spicer started a new 
company, Aegis, which was specifically designed to avoid combat, but would provide 
other security services.”32 
In the modern world, PMSC personnel are being used for a multitude of purposes in 
both conflict and post-conflict situations.
33
 As Francesco Francioni said, the use of 
PMSC personnel has become a “trend” and they “replace soldiers and members of the 
armed forces in a variety of situations that include armed conflict, prolonged military 
occupation, peacekeeping, and territorial administration in post-conflict institutional 
building and intelligence gathering.” 34  So if we must accept the use of Private 
Military Contractors in contemporary global activities, should we not regulate them? 
The lack of regulation on PMSC personnel is alarming. It is not that PMSC personnel 
are necessarily better or worse than any official armed forces, it is that any 
international body, or any international business (depending on how you view 
PMSCs) should be regulated, especially if they are used in conflict and post-conflict 
situations. Regulation should not just be used to serve the international community, it 
should be there for the PMSC personnel themselves, to avoid liability, and it should 
be there for the hiring state as well. If a hiring state has even the slightest chance of 
being held accountable for the actions of PMSC personnel, they need a system of 
regulation to provide evidence that they performed every action necessary to prevent 
PMSC personnel from violating the law, in order to protect themselves from liability. 
According to Francioni, the reliance on PMSC personnel, or private contractors, 
“diminishes the effectiveness of domestic mechanisms of democratic control over 
                                                 
30
Sarah Percy, Regulating the private security industry: a story of regulating the last war, 94 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 941–960,943, (2012), (referencing  Sarah Percy, 
Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007, 
Chapter 7.). 
31
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32
Id. at 228.   
33
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INT LAW 961–964 (2008). 
34
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armed forces, as required in all constitutional democracies.”35This is a scary fact to 
face; PMSCs create a situation that has not been completely covered by international 
law. For example, Katherine Chapman states that “private citizens employed by the 
U.S. military in undeclared wars had fallen into a legal loophole, practically beyond 
the reach of criminal law.”36She also states that, “PMCs must be held accountable for 
their criminal actions, not merely to provide personal justice for those injured by their 
crimes, but also for the strategic objectives of organizing the U.S. military's available 
manpower effectively and retaining the support of citizens both domestic and 
abroad.”37 
The United Nations Human Rights Council’s working group on Mercenaries has been 
given the task of analyzing PMSC activity and its effects.  The working group 
mentioned four items that it saw needed to be addressed. First, due to the increasing 
number of functions that PMSC personnel were performing which included 
interrogation of prisoners, the “contractors were more and more in contact with 
civilian populations and in situations where very serious human rights abuses could 
and did occur.” 38 Second, regulation of military contractors was “virtually 
nonexistent” in regards to national law39 . Contractors are often used in countries 
where the government or law is weak and the country they are operating in cannot 
control the “use of force.”40 The lack of regulation also included the Contractor’s 
home countries, where there were no rules on vetting or training armed contractors. 
Third, international law does nothing to mitigate the lack of regulation. There are no 
clear rules on what “governmental functions can be outsourced” and things like 
“direct participation in hostilities” and “engaging in combat functions” are not 
covered either
41. It is also important to mention that there is “no agreement on what 
due diligence obligations, if any, a state has.” 42 Fourth, because PMSCs work 
internationally, there is a greater need for an “international regulatory structure.”43 In 
                                                 
35
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36
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Id. at 1052. 
38
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39
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40
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many cases there is no clear way of determining what state has jurisdiction and 
responsibility.
44
 
If this is not enough to convince the international community of the need to regulate 
PMSC personnel, the two scandals involving major PMSCs should assist in 
exemplifying the need for regulation. The first incident is the Nisoor Square shooting, 
which involved the PMSC Company called Blackwater and ended with the deaths of 
17 Iraqi civilians
45
. According to the New York Times article From Errand to Fatal 
Shot to Hail of Fire to 17 Deaths: This incident occurred when PMSC personnel in a 
convoy seemed to open fire on civilians.
46
 To quote the article “the events in the 
square began with a short burst of bullets that witnesses described as unprovoked.”47It 
seems the contractors were controlling traffic for a convoy carrying important 
diplomatic personnel. While the Blackwater officials claim that their personnel were 
shot at, and the shooting was in self-defense, witnesses say it was not self-defense.
48
 
The second scandal is the Abu Ghraib prison issue, in which six civilian contractors 
were involved in the abuse of detainees
49
. According to the Washington Post article 6 
Employees From CACI International, Titan Referred for Prosecution: “CACI 
interrogators used dogs to scare prisoners, placed detainees in unauthorized "stress 
positions" and encouraged soldiers to abuse prisoners at Abu Ghraib
50
. Titan 
employees hit detainees and stood by while soldiers physically abused prisoners.”51 
One of the larger issues is highlighted by this quote in the article that claims the U.S. 
military was "unprepared for the arrival of contract interrogators and had no training 
to fall back on in the management, control, and discipline of these personnel.”52 This 
exemplifies the very issue of regulation and control of contractors. There is also the 
issue of regulation in regards to vetting and screening, for example the article states 
                                                 
44
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“about half of CACI's interrogators were not properly trained and that the military 
officer in charge of interrogations did not screen them before allowing them to 
conduct interrogations.”53 
 
These two incidents exemplify the need for regulation of PMSC personnel. The fact 
that the U.S. military did not know how to “control and discipline”54these PMSC 
operators lead to an incident of abuse.
55
 Without a system of regulation PMSCs are in 
“legal loophole” and can function with some immunity.56PMSC personnel are not 
necessarily any better or any worse than any other group, yet there should be an 
international system of regulation governing these PMSCs and their personnel. 
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III. How to regulate PMSCs 
 
There are two popular thought processes when it comes to the regulation of military 
contractors. The first school of thought comes from a scholar named Kristine Huskey. 
Huskey believes that the current regulation of military contractors by the international 
community is based on different “phases” to their operations and each phase is being 
regulated differently. In this analysis of the “existing legal regime”,57 Huskey picks 
apart the international system of regulation and exposes its shortcomings. While this 
theoretical system of regulation is complex it has the conceptual capability to work in 
regards to both PMSCs and multinational corporations. This theory will later be 
hypothetically intertwined with the regulation of PMSCs as multinationals. 
The second school of thought, which is mentioned by many academics, and is the 
school of thought I support, is the idea of labeling military contractors, thereby 
putting them in a category that is part of the modern system of regulation. The idea 
behind this school of thought is, in order to understand the possible avenues that 
international law can take, in an attempt to regulate PMSC’s, military contractors 
should be put in a category. Without a label, military contractors in essence may “slip 
through the cracks” of international law, preventing regulation from taking place.   
 
A. Huskey’s views 
To begin with Kristine Huskey’s opinion on the phases of military contracting, and 
how each phase is being regulated, I noticed that her opinion was created by a novel 
and revolutionary analysis that, while she picks the current system apart, does have 
the potential to be a solution to the problem of regulation in the future, assuming there 
is no other way of regulating military contractors. Huskey’s thoughts stem from her 
analysis of two of the largest events of misconduct that were perpetrated by military 
contractors, namely the company formerly known as Blackwater which was involved 
in the Nisoor Square shooting, and the companies Titian and CACI, and their torturing 
of detainees at Abu Ghraib.
58
 One of the most disturbing realizations Huskey made 
after her analysis of these incidents, is that all the talk of regulation and punishment, 
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Kristine A. Huskey, Accountability for Private Military and Security Contractors in the International 
Legal Regime, 31 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS193, 193, (2012). 
58
Id. at 194. 
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came post-incident.
59
 Following these incidents, there was an awareness of the 
“available mechanisms for criminal and civil accountability of the individuals whose 
misconduct caused the harm”. Huskey also makes a point of the weaknesses of post-
conduct liability analysis, stating that following an incident there is no way of 
knowing who to hold accountable, should it be the state that hired the military 
contractors, or whom?
60
 Two questions Huskey points out, about “post conduct 
accountability” are, first, “who is accountable for the conduct of PMSC’s?”, and 
secondly “to whom…such conduct can be attributed?” 61  This is very similar to 
Perret’s view on PMSC accountability when she states “The responsibility of private 
actors for violations of human rights is in question under the law of many 
jurisdictions.”62 To answer the questions of responsibility and accountability, Huskey 
breaks down the use of PMSC’s into three phases.63 At every phase Huskey points to 
who could be held accountable and possible systems of regulation. Basically, by 
breaking the use of PMSC’s down, Huskey has noticed that there are multiple bodies 
that could be responsible for regulation. 
 
1. Three Phases 
Huskey’s phase argument stems from her belief that not enough attention is being 
paid to “pre-conduct accountability.”64She believes there should be a responsibility of 
“hiring, hosting, and monitoring” of contractors, by those who use PMSC’s, as well as 
a “responsibility to the victims” of misconduct by military contractors.65In order to 
understand the regulatory system, Huskey presents us with three “phases” which 
cover “the "life cycle" of a PMSC.”66 The first phase is the Contracting Phase, the 
point in time where the state is hiring PMSC’s or their personnel. In the Contracting 
Phase the hiring state is extremely important because it has the ability to determine 
important factors that play into contracting these personnel. Some examples of factors 
that can be determined, by Huskey’s account, are things like “scope of activities to be 
outsourced; who can be hired including license requirements, and what screening, or 
                                                 
59
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vetting, mechanisms can be used; whether previous allegations /conduct/ violations 
play a factor in the hiring process; and the scope of the contract (for example, location 
of contract performance).”67In essence the hiring state acts like a “gatekeeper” in that 
they set the requirements and responsibilities of the PMSC personnel they are hiring. 
Huskey gives an interesting example when she says “the hiring state can determine 
that translation for interrogation (but not interrogation itself) can be outsourced.”68 
However, the hiring state is not the only one that has influence during the Contracting 
Phase.
69
 
The home state (the state in which the PMSC was formed and operates) has power 
over PMSC’s during the Contracting Phase as well. The power and authority the home 
states have is the power to suspend or remove the licenses of these corporations and to 
prevent them from being hired.
70
 So we see that there are two states that have 
influence over the PMSC and their personnel during the Contracting Phase. One of 
the most interesting facts about the Contracting Phase is that unlike the other two 
phases, this phase is not involved with International Human Rights Law or 
International Humanitarian law. In this phase domestic law is the system that covers 
contracts, and the agreements made within them.
71
 
The second phase is what is called the “In-the-Field Phase”. This is the phase in 
which the largest amount of damage can be done and the most people can be affected. 
At this point, also called the “theatre of war”, PMSC personnel will be “potentially 
interacting with various individuals, such as military forces, other PMSC personnel, 
civilian nationals and local police of the Host state.”72 This phase takes place in the 
Host state, the state in which the PMSC personnel are operating, which is where 
regulation problems can arise. Both the Host state and the Hiring state may have 
differing opinions of how to regulate these personnel, and their interests for this 
regulation may be “overlapping, or competing.” 73  There may also be issues in 
enforcement of regulation, such as a “failed infrastructure” (Host state), which can 
prevent efficient regulation from coalescing. In this phase the Home state, 
theoretically, should be involved in regulation of their military contractors as well. 
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The Home state should monitor the PMSCs and punish those actors who break either 
the domestic law of the Host state or don’t follow “international guidelines.”74The 
factors that Huskey lists for this phase include “domestic and international laws, 
regulations, and codes of conduct applicable to PMSC personnel conduct in the field; 
monitoring mechanisms, and which state has responsibility to monitor and ensure 
compliance with such laws, regulations, and codes of conduct; and responsibility of 
other bodies (for example, international organizations) for monitoring and ensuring 
compliance with the same laws.”75 
In this phase, Huskey believes that not only International Humanitarian law, but 
International Human Rights law, can be applicable. There are many instances where 
military contractors may have violated international law, yet the violence is used in an 
unstable area, where the violence “doesn’t amount to a conflict.”76 In this case, where 
there is no conflict, the laws of Humanitarian Law do not apply. Huskey goes on to 
say that Human Rights Law may in fact have “a wider range of accountability 
mechanisms” which she believes may include “monitoring by United Nations special 
rapporteurs and field officers.”77 Human Rights Law also allows those who have been 
wronged to petition their case, and there is a system in place for them to receive 
compensation if they prove a harm done to them.
78
 International Human Rights Law 
is applicable in situations of “reconstruction or civil strife”79 where there is no official 
conflict. These situations are also where PMSC personnel are frequently deployed and 
used. Also, there are non-derogable human rights that must be respected even during 
an armed conflict. Therefore, International Human Rights Law is applicable to PMSC 
personnel. One point Huskey makes concerning human rights, is the right to life, 
which may be violated in cases where PMSC personnel are acting in self-defense or 
are in combat. However, during a conflict PMSC personnel may violate the right to 
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life if they are not considered “legal combatants.” 80 This is why labeling and 
categorizing PMSC personnel is so important, without knowing where to put them we 
don’t understand how to regulate them, or to consider some actions violations. 
Another human rights violation that PMSCs have potential to violate is “the right to 
be free from torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment”, as set out by the 
“United Nations Convention Against Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment.”81 The reason that PMSC personnel have a potential to violate this right is 
because many times they are used as guards. Their job may include guarding people 
or detention centers. 
As mentioned earlier, the Abu Ghraib issue was one of PMSC personnel abuses that 
reached the level of torture as well as the use of cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment.
82
 These acts could not have been given legitimate reason to have occurred. 
Even during a time of emergency or an armed conflict these rights cannot be violated 
with the exception of “only if and to the extent that the situation constitutes a threat to 
the life of the nation.”83 While International Human Rights can be used to regulate 
PMSC personnel, there is also a draw back in using this form of law. For example, 
during a time of conflict International Humanitarian Law is given the lex specialis 
privilege and can override human rights.
84
 Enforcement can also be an issue, 
especially because International Human Rights Law only applies to people who are 
“in the territory or jurisdiction of a state party to the instrument.”85 There is also an 
issue of responsibility for violations. To use an example from Huskey’s literature, “a 
PMSC from Home State X, contracted by Hiring State Y, sends personnel to operate 
in Host State Z—a failed state that lacks capacity to protect—it is unclear which state 
has the legal responsibility to ensure human rights violations are not occurring in Host 
State Z.”86, which again leads to the issue of categorization of PMSC personnel. The 
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home state would be responsible for its armed forces if they violated an individual’s 
human rights, yet because we have not categorized PMSCs it is unclear where the 
responsibility lies. 
The third phase Huskey recognizes is the “Post-Conduct Phase”; the phase where we 
assume that a military contractor has harmed someone. Huskey, points out that this 
harm can be the result of an act, or a result of an omission.
87
 At this point, following 
the violation, the focus is on the consequential results of the situation. Will the victim 
be given recompense and justice? Will the PMSC personnel responsible face criminal 
charges? These are the questions that should be answered during this phase. The 
important factors, according to Huskey, are the following: 
applicable law or legal doctrines to determine who is accountable/liable (for 
example, PMSC, individual, state) for the relevant conduct, and to whom; 
applicable criminal laws and mechanisms, and which state or international 
body has responsibility to enforce such laws, or, if not currently existing, to 
enact them; applicable civil liability laws and mechanisms, and which state or 
international body has responsibility to enforce such laws, or, if not currently 
existing, to enact them; and responsibility to provide reparations to victims, 
independent of civil liability lawsuits.
88
 
While it is extremely important to determine who should be accountable for the 
actions taken by PMSC personnel, Huskey also notes that it is just as important to 
determine who is responsible to remedy the situation for the victims of these 
violations. 
2. Options for Redress 
During the “Post-Conduct Phase”, International Human Rights law finds itself in a 
situation that provides plenty of problems. To begin, even though it seems individuals 
should be held responsible for International Human Rights breaches, it is actually 
states that are held responsible. As stated in the ICCPR states must take measures to 
assure they “exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm 
caused by such acts by private persons or entities... [and]provide effective remedies in 
the event of breach.”89 This leaves all of the power to the states, and their domestic 
law to remedy the situation. Theoretically, this allows for a good system of criminal 
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liability and punishment. By allowing the states to handle the situation themselves, 
limiting the issues of international criminal charges and determining who tries the 
accused contractors. However, these states may not feel they need to punish the 
PMSC personnel for their actions. In this case, there is no international legal system 
of enforcement. So if states choose not to punish the charged personnel, there is no 
way to make them. 
The individuals who have been harmed do have a system of recompense, under 
international law. These people, who have suffered a violation of their rights, can 
petition the Human Rights Committee. This, according to the ICCPR can be done in 
order to remedy the situation; but can only be done only if the violation was 
committed within the territory of a country who is “party to the Optional Protocol to 
the ICCPR.”90 This can be avoided if the victims were “within the power, or under the 
effective control, of a state party to the Optional Protocol in a territory which is within 
the state’s extraterritorial jurisdictional reach.” 91  These facts, unfortunately lend 
themselves to defend the United States, and its obligations in regards to the Military 
Contractors in Iraq. Due to the fact that the United States is not a party to the ICCPR 
Optional Protocol, it can be said that the US is not responsible for the punishment of 
the PMSC personnel it brought to Iraq, or for bringing justice or providing reparations 
to the victims. It should also be mentioned that the US would not be responsible for 
ensuring that the PMSC personnel obey human rights laws, within Iraq. What is 
worse is that because the US is not a party to the Optional Protocol, victims of the 
actions executed by the PMSC personnel cannot petition for remedy.
92
 
International Humanitarian Law provides little help, as well, when it comes to the 
“Post-Conduct Phase”, it provides so little help that Huskey goes as far as to say “IHL 
is mostly silent.”93When speaking about remedy and redress for victims, International 
Humanitarian Law literally says nothing.
94
 There are only three conventions of 
International Humanitarian Law that allows for any analysis of PMSC personnel 
during the “Post-Conduct Phase”. According to Huskey, the Fourth Hague convention 
alongside the Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention are two tools that “may address 
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state responsibility for organs”, these organs being the PMSCs they hire.95 However, 
Huskey states that the “International Law Commission's(ILC) Articles on 
Responsibility for States for Internationally Wrongful Acts” are what is really needed 
to determine who is responsible for IHL violations in a situation involving a non-state 
actor such as a PMSC.
96
 The issue with the ILC articles is that they are vague when it 
comes to narrowing down responsibility. For example, it states in the articles that the 
state is responsible for a private actor when “’empowered by the law of that State to 
exercise elements of governmental authority’ or are de facto acting on its instructions 
or under its direction and control.”97 In the case of the Nisoor square shooting, the 
Black Water PMSC personnel involved, even though they were contracted by 
America, did not necessarily perform actions attributable to the United States. The 
American government claims they were “not acting as employees of the U.S.”98This 
means that, according to the United States, Black Water was “neither exercising 
governmental authority nor acting under its control or supervision.”99 
 
3. Criminal law 
Huskey also raises the question of International Criminal Law’s place in the system of 
PMSC accountability in the “Post-Conduct Phase”. The most important aspect of 
International Criminal Law is that it gives validity and power to International 
Humanitarian Law as well as International Human Rights Law. It does this because it 
criminalizes certain transgressions and violations of these bodies of law.
100
Huskey, 
points out that International Criminal law has its basis in treaties, and international 
customs.
101
 International Customs cannot be violated, and if they are the international 
community can become involved. International Criminal law would be the strongest 
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choice to use against violators, especially ones that are non-state actors, since 
customary law holds jurisdiction over everyone. Huskey also mentions that 
International criminal tribunals, such as the ICC or International Criminal Court 
create jurisprudence which provides laws for International Criminal Law. 
The reason Huskey mentions International Criminal Law in the “Post-Conduct Phase” 
is that she says that International Criminal Law is “narrowly focused on achieving 
criminal accountability of individuals during the Post-Conduct Phase.”102 By looking 
at the ICC and the crimes under its jurisdiction, Huskey has narrowed down the type 
of crimes PMSC personnel are most likely to commit. According to Huskey the ICC 
covers “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community": 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression”. Huskey 
believes that the crimes against humanity and the war crimes are the two crimes that 
PMSC personnel are most likely to violate.
103
 So if the ICC has the ability to 
prosecute these crimes, why have there been not been more charges brought against 
PMSC personnel who commit these crimes? The ICC itself has certain limitations as 
well it seems. The ICC cannot prosecute people for these crimes unless the crimes 
were “committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of 
such crimes.”104There is also an argument that states that PMSC personnel may not 
even be able to commit “war crimes”; because “war crimes” theoretically must be 
committed by “members of the armed forces of either party to the conflict, that their 
acts are attributable to either party, that they are exercising public authority, or that 
they are de facto representing the government to support the war effort.”105A war 
crime also has to be “part of a ‘widespread or systematic practice’” and must be used 
“in furtherance of a State or organizational policy.”106 Labeling something as a “war 
crime” seems to be a tricky issue, and can prevent criminals from being brought to 
justice. Another issue is that the ICC does not have its own police or military force. 
This makes enforcement very limited, and in effect creates a problem when it comes 
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to investigation and prosecution. In these situations the ICC must rely upon the honest 
help and cooperation of states.
107
 
Huskey’s analysis of the current system of regulation, regarding PMSCs and their 
personnel, is presented from an interesting angle. While I believe that PMSCs should 
be put in a category, in order for them to be regulated more efficiently, Huskey’s 
phased approach posits an interesting idea. If the international community were to 
take these three phases that Huskey has analyzed, and create a system of regulation 
based on the phases, they could regulate PMSC personnel more efficiently. For 
example, there should be a certain standard of behavior and conduct that is spelled out 
in the contracts of PMSC personnel. Since the hiring State is responsible for setting 
the standards and responsibilities for these personnel, there should be a regulation of 
the contracts and the agreements made. Phase by phase the system of regulation 
would change, but it would help to organize the ways in which PMSC personnel are 
regulated. 
 
B. Categorization 
The second school of thought, regarding the regulation of PMSCs, is the school of 
thought that calls for a categorization of PMSCs and their personnel. The status of 
PMSC personnel is a widely debated topic that could have a huge effect on the way 
that PMSCs are seen by the public. The first theory, in regards to the status of PMSC 
personnel, is that they are mercenaries, hired to fight. The second idea is that PMSC 
personnel are actually civilian non-combatants who are hired for a variety of reasons 
and if they join in battle they become “unlawful combatants”. The third, and not as 
widely discussed category that PMSCs could fit, is that of Multinational corporations. 
While this category seems odd, and not many authors have covered this category, it is 
a personal favorite of mine. After researching PMSCs and analyzing the ways in 
which they have, or could be regulated, in my  opinion that considering them 
corporations and regulating them in  that manner may be more effective then treating 
them as mercenaries, or as unlawful combatants. 
1. Mercenaries 
The First School of thought, regarding military contractors, is that they act as 
mercenaries, and should be legally labeled as mercenaries under international law. 
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The first issue in labeling PMSC personnel as mercenaries is that there does not seem 
to be a clear definition of what makes a fighter a mercenary. According to Sarah 
Percy, contemporary critics define mercenaries based on two components: foreign 
status, and motivation. Foreign status means that a mercenary should have “no 
national association with any of the parties to the conflict in which they fight.”108The 
second component that defines a mercenary is that his primary motive, his drive for 
fighting is monetary gain.
109
 These two defining factors are immediately criticized by 
Percy, and are dismissed as insufficient and incorrect. It should be mentioned that it is 
not necessarily possible to determine the motivation of a fighter, and even if it could 
be proven that a fighter is motivated by financial gain, according to Percy, his 
motivations may change over time and he could “later adopt the cause.”110If a fighter 
started to believe in the cause he is fighting for, then, according to the current view of 
mercenaries, he would cease to be a mercenary because his motivations would have 
changed. It is also known that many soldiers join the armed forces for financial 
reasons. As Percy stated “the military promotes itself as a “career option”111 with 
attractive pay and benefits.”112 
Under international law, the main definition of a mercenary can be found in the 
Geneva Convention. In article 47 of Additional Protocol 1 of the Geneva Convention 
(sub section 2) a mercenary is defined using a number of criteria. Article 47 states: 
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A mercenary is any person who: 
 
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed 
conflict; 
 
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities; 
 
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for 
private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, 
material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to 
combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party; 
 
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory 
controlled by a Party to the conflict; 
 
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and 
 
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official 
duty as a member of its armed forces.
113
 
 
This definition is not only complex in nature, but it requires all of the criteria to be 
met in order for a fighter to be considered a mercenary. For example, if it could be 
proven that a fighter meets all the criteria, but the amount the fighter is paid is not 
“substantially in excess of that...paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions…in 
the armed forces” 114  then the fighter is not considered a mercenary. The term 
“substantially in excess”115 is itself extremely debatable, and that is only a fraction of 
the criteria that must be met. 
There can be an argument made for labeling PMSC personnel as mercenaries. Of the 
PMSC personnel functioning in Iraq twenty percent were citizens of the United States 
of America, this is compared to the forty percent of “third country nationals” who 
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were not U.S. citizens or citizens of the country they were functioning in.
116
 These 
statistics show a large number of personnel who could potentially fit the Geneva 
Convention definition of a Mercenary. U.S. citizens, would not fit the definition 
because they are “a national of a party to the conflict” 117 and therefore they do not 
fulfill subsection (d). The “third country nationals,”118 however, are not nationals to a 
party to the conflict. This makes labeling them as mercenaries much easier. The 
difficult part is determining if they “take a direct part in hostilities” 119  which is 
debatable currently in international law. The other difficult part, in categorizing these 
fighters as mercenaries, is determining their motivation. It seems almost impossible to 
determine a fighter’s motivation. Even if it were possible, as I mentioned earlier, 
motivations can change.
120
 
Categorizing PMSC personnel as mercenaries would require an overhauling of the 
definition of a mercenary, under international law. Many PMSC personnel would not 
fit the definition, and this would create a system where regulation of PMSC personnel 
is applicable only if the individual fighter fits the definition of a mercenary. The 
definition is so ambiguous it is almost impossible to fit the definition of a mercenary. 
“Any mercenary who cannot exclude himself from this definition deserves to be shot- 
and his lawyer with him!”121 
 
2. Civilians/ “Unlawful Combatants”  
The Second school of thought is that of civilian non-combatants. This school of 
thought posits that PMSC personnel are hired for a variety of reasons and those that 
actually see combat are considered “unlawful combatants”. According to Richard 
Quigley, PMSC personnel who work with the armed forces are “civilian non-
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combatants whose conduct may be attributable to the United States.”122 The armed 
contractors, however, create a situation that is not covered under international law. 
According to Quigley, a civilian captured during an international armed conflict, 
should notbe treated as a Prisoner Of War
123
, because they are considered civilians, 
which means they are non-combatants and have not been granted permission to fight 
in the conflict.
124
 This leaves armed contractors, as well as contractors that participate 
in the hostilities in a “grey area.”125 Once military contractors begin to participate in 
hostilities, which is hard to determine since participation is a hotly debated topic, they 
become legal targets and can be tried as criminals for their participation.
126
 
Combatants are fighters who have the “right to participate directly in hostilities,”127 
and therefore these combatants cannot be considered criminals for the acts of war they 
commit. They can only be held accountable for the actions that violate international 
Humanitarian Law, especially things like war crimes. This is due to the fact that 
combatants are lawful military targets.
128
 This means they have traded their civilian 
status, and the protection of not being a lawful target, for the ability to fight, wound 
and kill their opponents. Being recognized as a combatant allows for Prisoner of War 
status, if captured and these POWs then “benefit from the protection of the Third 
Geneva Convention.”129 So, one of the major differences between a combatant and an 
“unlawful combatant” is the POW status given during capture. The reason the PMSC 
personnel are not considered combatants is that they fail to meet the criteria. For 
example, Quigley states that “groups that come under military command and meet 
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certain criteria… qualify as combatants” 130  and because “contract employees fall 
outside the military chain of command” they will not get POW status.131 
The third Geneva Convention gives us an idea of what a prisoner of war is. In article 4 
it states: 
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons 
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the 
power of the enemy: 
 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as 
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
 
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, 
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to 
the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this 
territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, 
including such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following 
conditions: 
 
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; 
 
(c) that of carrying arms openly; 
 
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and 
customs of war. 
 
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a 
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining Power. 
 
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being 
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members thereof, such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war 
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labour units or of services 
responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they have 
received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany, who 
shall provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to the 
annexed model. 
 
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the 
merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the 
conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable treatment under any other 
provisions of international law. 
 
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the 
enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without 
having had time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided 
they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of war. 
 
B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the 
present Convention: 
 
(1) Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the 
occupied country, if the occupying Power considers it necessary by reason 
of such allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated 
them while hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in 
particular where such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin 
the armed forces to which they belong and which are engaged in combat, 
or where they fail to comply with a summons made to them with a view to 
internment. 
 
(2) The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the 
present Article, who have been received by neutral or non-belligerent 
Powers on their territory and whom these Powers are required to intern 
under international law, without prejudice to any more favourable 
treatment which these Powers may choose to give and with the exception 
25 
 
of Articles 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph , 58 -67, 92, 126 and, where 
diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the conflict and the 
neutral or non-belligerent Power concerned, those Articles concerning the 
Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the Parties to a 
conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform 
towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the 
present Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties 
normally exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and 
treaties. 
 
C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and 
chaplains as provided for in Article 33of the present Convention.
132
 
 
A civilian who accompanied the armed forces without being a member of them which 
could consist of “such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war 
correspondents, supply contractors, members of labor units or of services responsible 
for the welfare of the armed forces.” 133  This segment seems to cover Military 
contractors who perform duties that do not constitute direct participation. The Geneva 
Convention also touches upon “Members of other militias and members of other 
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a 
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory”, however there are 
criteria that need to be met for these militia fighters to be recognized, such as: “being 
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;… having a fixed distinctive 
sign recognizable at a distance; carrying arms openly;…conducting their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war.”134If combatants are granted POW 
status, and PMSC personnel are not, then it can be inferred that the PMSC personnel 
are in fact not considered combatants. 
This also tells us that civilians are people who are not included in Article 4’s sections 
(1), (2), (3) and (6). Civilians, under international law, are “entitled to general 
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protection against the dangers arising from military operations.”135 This also means 
that armed forces are not legally allowed to target civilians. However, this also means 
that civilians are not legally allowed to take part in hostilities and if they do so they 
become a legal target for armed forces.
136
 What does this mean for PMSC personnel? 
PMSC personnel, unless considered part of the armed forces of a State, and meeting 
the criteria to be considered such, are civilians. Those PMSC personnel who choose to 
directly participate in the hostilities are then considered “unlawful combatants”. 
According to Dormann, this means they would be “… persons taking a direct part in 
hostilities without being entitled to do so and who therefore cannot be classified as 
prisoners of war on falling into the power of the enemy.”137These fighters are entitled 
to some protection under international law. For example, “unlawful combatants” are 
given the treatment as described by Article 75 of Additional Protocol 1. It is even 
stated in Article 45 of Protocol 1 that “any person who has taken part in hostilities, 
who is not entitled to prisoner of-war status and who does not benefit from more 
favorable treatment in accordance with the Fourth Convention shall have the right at 
all times to the protection of Article 75 of this Protocol.”138Article 75 of Additional 
Protocol 1 specifies the “fundamental guarantees”139 of captured people.140 
Article 75  -- Fundamental guarantees 
 
1. In so far as they are affected by a situation referred to in Article 1 of this 
Protocol, persons who are in the power of a Party to the conflict and who do 
not benefit from more favourable treatment under the Conventions or under 
this Protocol shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as 
a minimum, the protection provided by this Article without any adverse 
distinction based upon race, color [sic], sex, language, religion or belief, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other 
status, or on any other similar criteria. Each Party shall respect the person, 
honour, convictions and religious practices of all such persons. 
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2. The following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any 
place whatsoever, whether committed by civilian or by military agents: 
 
(a) violence to the life, health, or physical or mental well-being of persons, in 
particular: 
 
(i) murder; 
 
(ii) torture of all kinds, whether physical or mental; 
 
(iii) corporal punishment; and 
 
(iv) mutilation; 
 
(b) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault; 
 
(c) the taking of hostages; 
 
(d) collective punishments; and 
 
(e) threats to commit any of the foregoing acts. 
 
3. Any person arrested, detained or interned for actions related to the armed 
conflict shall be informed promptly, in a language he understands, of the 
reasons why these measures have been taken. Except in cases of arrest or 
detention for penal offences, such persons shall be released with the minimum 
delay possible and in any event as soon as the circumstances justifying the 
arrest, detention or internment have ceased to exist. 
 
4. No sentence may be passed and no penalty may be executed on a person 
found guilty of a penal offence related to the armed conflict except pursuant to 
a conviction pronounced by an impartial and regularly constituted court 
28 
 
respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure, 
which include the following: 
 
(a) the procedure shall provide for an accused to be informed without delay of 
the particulars of the offence alleged against him and shall afford the accused 
before and during his trial all necessary rights and means of defense [sic]; 
 
(b) no one shall be convicted of an offence except on the basis of individual 
penal responsibility; 
 
(c) no one shall be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of 
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under the 
national or international law to which he was subject at the time when it was 
committed; nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than that which was 
applicable at the time when the criminal offence was committed; if, after the 
commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of a 
lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby; 
 
(d) anyone charged with an offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law; 
 
(e) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to be tried in his 
presence; 
 
(f) no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt; 
 
(g) anyone charged with an offence shall have the right to examine, or have 
examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and 
examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses 
against him; 
 
(h) no one shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an offence in 
respect of which a final judgment [sic] acquitting or convicting that person has 
been previously pronounced under the same law and judicial procedure; 
29 
 
 
(i) anyone prosecuted for an offence shall have the right to have the judgment 
[sic] pronounced publicly; and 
 
(j) a convicted person shall be advised on conviction of his judicial and other 
remedies and of the time-limits within which they may be exercised.
141
 
 
The article specifies that anyone who doesn’t “benefit from more favorable 
treatment…shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, as a 
minimum, the protection provided by this Article.”142In the article a list of acts are to 
be considered “prohibited at any time any place” and they include things like murder, 
torture, mutilation and standards that must be met if charges are brought against the 
prisoner and standards for the trial.
143
 
Considering PMSC personnel “unlawful combatants” is not the best route to follow. 
By considering them “unlawful combatants” that also means there is limited control 
over these personnel, since they are not part of the official armed forces. For example, 
Jeffery Morton argues that by denying people POW status and combatant status we 
actually “reduce the regulatory capacity” over certain fighters.144 A possible solution 
would be to simply consider PMSC personnel combatants, solving many of the 
problems of regulation. This, however, is likely not to happen. One of the benefits of 
using PMSC personnel is that they are not considered part of the armed forces of the 
state that uses them, a benefit many states are not willing to lose. Sid Ellington stated 
that “the use of contractors allowed for ‘a much more politically palatable troop 
count.’”145According to Francesco Francioni, using PMSC personnel can lead to “the 
possibility of circumventing the requirement of parliamentary authorization for 
specific missions and services” as well as “going beyond limits on the number of 
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troops to be deployed abroad or allowed to serve in a theatre of military 
operations.”146 
 
3. Corporations 
The last and most recent way that Military contractors can be categorized, is by 
treating PMSCs as multinational corporations. There is currently not much discourse 
covering the idea of treating PMSCs as corporations, however it may yet prove to be 
one of the better possibilities for regulation. By following the international system of 
regulation for multinational corporations, PMSCs may behave in a better manner. 
According to Andrew Clapham, the best way to ensure a company is brought “into 
line” and to “ensure redress for the victims and ensure non-repetition” is to “highlight 
the misbehavior of the company” which can have a negative effect on the company’s 
future opportunities.
147
 Clapham believes that the international community may be 
able to bring PMSCs to heel by “focusing on the liability and reputation”148 of these 
corporations. While it is possible that many PMSC corporations, especially the well-
connected ones, do not fear a bad reputation, it is also possible that there will 
eventually be a shift in way PMSCs are chosen. For example, if a certain PMSC 
repeatedly gets caught violating international law and caught in scandalous situations, 
states may choose a competitor that will bring less negative publicity. 
Clapham believes that in the international system there has been a movement away 
from “actual international law to norms and principles that are negotiated and adopted 
by the relevant parties”. These “norms and principles” can include things like “codes 
of conduct.”149 This supports the idea that PMSCs could be treated as multinational 
corporations, especially because corporations may be willing to “go beyond the 
traditional norms accepted by states.”150 In regards to things like “codes of conduct”, 
due to the very fact that they are not treaties, more detail can be added to the text,
151
 
and will more likely be accepted. 
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Clapham also notes that there is a new shift in the system of accountability for 
corporations. For example, to guide corporate behavior, states are focusing on the 
certification these corporations need in order to operate. Clapham states that “gaining 
or losing a certificate could be as effective, if not more effective, in affecting behavior 
than winning or losing cases in the courts.”152Another advantage Clapham sees is the 
ability for hiring states to demand that PMSCs abide by the codes of conduct. 
Clapham mentions that the United Nations requires that “an armed private security 
company must be a member company of the International Code of Conduct for 
Private Security Service Providers.
153
 So it seems that the new system of control over 
these corporations is reputation. PMSCs as well as other corporations are trying to 
“minimize risks to their reputation.”154 
Oddly enough, this system of categorization may please those critics who believe that 
PMSC personnel are mercenaries. By focusing on the reputation of the PMSC 
corporations, and regulating their ability to operate, states are focusing on the money 
these PMSCs can stand to make. Those that believe that PMSC personnel are 
mercenaries must also believe that their motivation is “the desire for private gain.”155 
Threatening the ability of corporations to make profit would, theoretically, also 
threaten the mercenary’s primary motivation for operating. Overall this category 
provides for a new and novel way to regulate PMSCs. It appears that by categorizing, 
and regulating PMSCs as multinational corporations, the international community can 
more effectively control military contractors. 
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IV. Regulation of Multinationals 
 
Regulation of multinational corporations, or MNCs, is a tricky subject, in the fact that 
it intertwines with international law. The fact that multinational corporations operate 
through and within multiple countries, and therefore multiple jurisdictions, can create 
scenarios that are incredibly complex. 
Specifically regarding human rights, Muchlinski states that multinationals, being 
private entities, “do not have any positive duty to observe human rights…Thus it is 
for the state to regulate…”156 It is also interesting that Muchlinski points out that 
multinationals only have the ability to influence human rights by treating their 
workers well, but otherwise the rest is left up to the state.
157
 PMSCs are a bit different 
insofar as they can also observe human rights law by their actions, yet the general idea 
is similar, besides harming others, or mistreating their own people, PMSCs as well as 
MNCs may not have any influence over human rights, meaning that states are the 
primary actors of regulation and influence in that area.
158
 
 
A. Sovereignty and territory 
To begin, the sovereignty of each state over its territory builds barriers to 
regulation.
159
 For example, if Germany wants to regulate a multinational based within 
its territory, but operating in China, it has to be careful not to violate the sovereignty 
of the Chinese state. As Muchlinski puts it “should the territorial principle of state 
jurisdiction be observed to the letter, any assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a 
state would amount to a violation of international law.”160 The sovereignty principle 
creates a duty of “non-intervention”161, and prevents home states from regulating their 
multinationals.
162
 There is, however, a change beginning to take form. Brownlie 
believes that the international legal system is evolving “in light of the need to modify 
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the territorial principle.” 163  There are also alternative types of jurisdiction being 
suggested, with the exception that they maintain a real “connection between the 
subject-matter of jurisdiction and the territorial base”, and also that they preserve 
“reasonable interests, of the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction.”164 
The first principle that can be used to have jurisdictional domain over nationals in 
foreign territory is the nationality principle.
165
 In certain cases, it is accepted that a 
state can have “jurisdiction over its nationals abroad.”166 Using this principle, a home 
state could, theoretically, justify jurisdiction over the activities of a corporation in a 
foreign territory. The managers of said corporation “could be subject to home country 
legal requirements.”167 If there are no home country nationals on the board of the 
subsidiary, the home country could make the parent company order its overseas units 
to act in accordance with home country laws. This is done through the “nationality of 
the parent company as the principle shareholder in the foreign subsidiary”, which 
effectively negates the “foreign nationality of incorporation of the subsidiary.” 168 
There is also the case of the parent company operating in foreign territory, “through 
unincorporated branches” which will “retain the nationality of the parent” and in turn 
can be brought under the “direct jurisdiction” of the home country because of their 
“corporate nationality.”169 In the case of United States banks operating overseas, this 
specific jurisdictional application has been significant for regulation.
170
 
The second regulatory principle that may be applicable is the “objective territorial 
jurisdiction” principle. This modification of the territorial principle comes into play 
when the “elements of a criminal offence are commenced in one state and are 
completed in another.”171 Originally accepted due to the infamous Lotus172 case, states 
have asserted they should have “objective territorial jurisdiction over offences 
initiated abroad and completed within the jurisdiction”.173 To reach “non- resident” 
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units of multinationals
174
, the United States has put its antitrust laws into play 
internationally, and states that “Anticompetitive conduct that affects U.S. domestic or 
foreign commerce may violate the U.S. antitrust law regardless of where such conduct 
occurs”175. It goes on to say that a violation can be committed by anyone no matter 
“the nationality of the parties involved.”176 The international courts did not make clear 
the limits and barriers of the principle; therefore it has been left up to the 
interpretation of states.
177
 Decisions of the ICJ have shown, however, that there is a 
need for a solid connection between the “subject-matter of the jurisdiction and the 
territory of the state seeking to exercise its jurisdiction.”178 
 
Exemplified in Muchlinski’s book, are situations in which states have attempted to 
regulate their multinationals. One of the examples given is that of the “jurisdiction to 
prescribe”. The United States has attempted to “extend its laws to non-resident units 
of MNEs.” The way this has been justified is through the need for “regulatory 
effectiveness in major fields of economic and public policy”. The U.S. has asserted 
this principle for many reasons including: “to restrict exports of goods by overseas 
subsidiaries… to prevent the avoidance of US trade embargoes;” or “to freeze the 
assets of unfriendly powers held in banks accounts located in overseas branches of US 
banks.”179 This principle  shows that the “state has jurisdiction to prescribe on the 
basis of territorial control, effects within the jurisdiction, the nationality of the person 
or entity subject to control, and under the protective principle.”180 
 
B. Legal forms of Multinationals 
In order to understand the ways in which multinational corporations are regulated, an 
analysis of the legal forms of multinationals must be undertaken. This analysis should 
include such information as: nature of the business activity, transaction costs, the 
extent to which the law will require the use of a particular structure and most 
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importantly, the principal national characteristics of the firm as well as the legal form 
within which they operate.
181
 However, it must be kept in mind that the goal of the 
firm is to gain as much profit as possible
182
; therefore, it is safe to assume that firms 
will usually try to reduce regulatory burdens.
183
 
The first legal form of a multinational corporation to be analyzed is the “contractual 
form”.  In the contractual form of a multinational corporation, the corporation can 
supply foreign markets without the creation of “an owned and controlled subsidiary in 
the host state”.184 The legally binding contracts that are used by this type of firm can 
go from one-time export deals to multiple or permanent “international 
consortia”.185This type of firm has the potential to create a novel business category 
due to the fact that it is an association that uses corporate and contractual systems of 
operation, and therefore it is beyond the separation between corporations and 
contracts.
186
 This multinational form is important to analyze due to its similarity to 
PMSC operations. PMSCs operate as multinationals through contracts, and they do 
not necessarily need a subsidiary in the state in which they choose to work. 
The second form of a multinational corporation is the Public Private Partnership.  
These contracts typically give concessions to foreign private contractors for a given 
length of time “whereupon ownership vests in the public or private sector of the host 
country.” 187   The organizational system that public private partnerships follow is 
centered on technology and man power.
188
 Usually the private parties will obtain the 
financial backing, usually by way of “project finance”, and supply the technology and 
the knowledge of its use. The local partner will most often provide the workforce and 
man power and many times the supporting infrastructure for the project.
189
 The 
advantage of a public private partnership is that the state retains its strategic control 
over the operations and after the contractual period is done, it gains the assets and 
attracts further capital for the future. This also helps accelerate the process of 
construction in regards to the project.
190
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The third and most common idea of what a multinational corporation is the “equity 
based corporate group”.191 This consists of a group of companies that are controlled 
by a parent company. The parent company controls the other companies by holding 
shares in said companies
192
. There are multiple forms of these groups, and they vary 
in organization and their relationships. There is one main form of equity based groups 
that Muchlinski touches upon, which seems most relative to the regulatory aspect of 
MNCs. This structure is aptly named “the Anglo-American ‘pyramid’ group”.193 
 In this structure, a parent company “owns and controls a network of wholly or 
majority-owned subsidiaries.” These subsidiaries can themselves be “intermediate 
holding companies for sub-groups of closely held subsidiaries.” This creates a 
pyramid like organizational structure, with the parent as the tip of the pyramid. 
Muchlinski points out that when this “pyramid” is involved in multiple countries, this 
forms the traditional and stereotypical view of what a multinational enterprise is, and 
this model is what has guided most of the MNC regulatory thinking.
194
 One of the 
gaps, however, that this structure leaves, is the ability of a parent company to use their 
subsidiaries to avoid regulatory laws. For example, Tom Hadden who studied the 
“legal and business organization of three British corporate groups”195, discovered that 
some corporations were using “agent only” businesses to reduce “the administrative 
burdens of full disclosure.” 196  The way these companies avoided their disclosure 
duties, was to transfer the assets from a subsidiary to a holding company. This 
allowed the subsidiary to trade as an agent of the holding company, obliged only to 
produce a formal balance sheet.” In this balance sheet, Hadden points out that the 
“capital would be typically offset by a loan to the holding company.”197 
Another important factor is the public. In today’s world information is more easily 
accessible via the internet, which makes awareness of the operations and violations of 
multinationals more widespread. Many might argue that although people know about 
the violations and scandals of corporations, they still buy the products. I understand 
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and agree that it does not always affect the corporation’s profits. However, the 
younger generations seem to be showing more concern about the world and the 
environment, and they may yet boycott these companies. Either way, the ability of 
information to be received at one’s finger tips will keep the corporations worrying 
about the possibilities of potential scandals and the consequences they stand to face. 
In regards to PMSCs, violations, being easily discovered, may hurt their business. As 
multinationals, PMSCs must look at their reputation as a selling point, a factor for 
future business. A bad reputation could hurt them significantly and give the 
competition an edge. 
 
1. Regulating the different forms 
In terms of regulation, the question then becomes is the “resulting legal structure” in 
correspondence with the decision making structure of the corporation and does this 
legal structure in essence cover put the corporation in a category, which then 
determines its legal responsibilities.. It is important to point out that the current legal 
structures of businesses, specifically contract and corporation, are not designed in a 
way that can fully cover multinational corporations, due to their complex and 
extensive nature. Contract is a system in which there is an “arm’s length relationship 
between otherwise independent entities of equal bargaining power” and therefore 
decision making power, responsibility and blame can be more easily placed. The 
corporation structure is comprised of a “single unit enterprise owned and controlled 
by its members”, and therefore it is responsible for its actions.198 
In regards to contracts there is the possibility of control by one firm, which brings to 
light an issue. Should the “contractual veil” be lifted or pierced in order to see who is 
in control of the undertakings, to create liability for the actions, of the subordinate, 
done under the directions of the dominant party. A similar question arises with equity 
based structures, in the fact that the “veil” could be lifted in order to understand 
between the parent and subsidiary companies, who made decisions they should be 
held liable for.
199
 
Some possible answers to these issues are outlined in Muchlinski’s work. When 
analyzing the weaknesses of the contractual system, Muchlinski mentions the 
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“'enterprise entity' ” theory which “deduces the parent company liability from the fact 
of economic integration between itself and the subsidiary.” This in effect considers the 
corporate group a new business association and paves the way for a “specialized legal 
regime” in the future.200  Muchlinski also states that competition laws be used to 
defend the business independence of weaker of the two entering into the contractual 
obligations.
201
 
2. Reforms 
When looking at the equity based multinational corporations, there are two reforms 
that are proposed by Muchlinski. First, is preferred by Hadden, and leans towards a 
reform of the structural side of the corporation. In this reform the corporation should 
be restructured so it “more closely corresponds to its business organization.” This 
includes the “existence of a relative unit for accounting, fiscal and other regulatory 
purposes.” 202  Hadden believes in the “identifiable legal representation of the 
underlying business activity,” which should be reformed to meet “modern 
realities.”203 This could create “new group enterprise forms for equity based groups,” 
which begs the question should informal alliances be required to reform and adopt a 
legal form?
204
 
The second reform method is preferred by Tricker, and is focusing on the operational 
side of the corporation. Tricker proposes leaving the legal form of the company as it 
is, but focusing on the obligations on specific establishments within the equity based 
group. Tricker believes that there should be an increase of the “obligations placed 
directly upon…divisions within the group.” From there he expects an “introduction of 
greater divisional disclosure through the concept of an ‘accountable business 
activity’.” Through this, managers become responsible for disclosing information 
“according to the actual lines of decision-making in the enterprise.” This improves 
upon the limits of the obligatory disclosure which is legally necessary, but only for 
“incorporated entities”.205 
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C. Corporate Social Responsibility 
The actual regulation of multinational corporations can be looked at from many 
angles. Different countries believe differently regarding the regulation of 
multinationals or corporate social responsibility. Virginia Harper Ho points out that 
the “constrained regulatory capacity” as well as “the limits of traditional command 
and control regulation” has caused states to look for more efficient ways of 
“incentivizing good corporate conduct”206 . Governments are now involved in the 
corporate social responsibility awareness, and demonstrate the acceptance of “soft 
law” and other “quasi-voluntary standards” which will cause a push towards a set of 
“minimum regulatory goals” 207 . While “soft law” may not have the strength to 
regulate PMSCs, Corporate Social Responsibility may be able to navigate formal 
regulation. As multinationals, PMSCs are concerned about profit and business, and 
given the right incentives; any multinational might adhere to standards. 
 An example of such a movement by a state is found by examining the Chinese 
corporate social responsibility policy. Throughout different levels of the government, 
China has created a system by which they “promote CSR as an explicit policy 
objective”208. One of the ways the Chinese government implements this, according to 
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Virginia Ho is through “legal compliance or regulatory mandates”209.  There are also 
measures that are “beyond regulation” but these are tied to “institutions and incentive 
structures”210. While China can be considered to be at the forefront in regards to the 
level of governmental support of CSR, the western world is just now beginning to pay 
attention to this issue.
211
 
 
1. Definition 
While Corporate Social Responsibility does not have a set definition, there are two 
aspects that most definitions include: first the way in which a corporation conducts its 
operations, which is also known as “good corporate citizenship”. The second aspect is 
in regards to the corporation’s response to stakeholders of all kinds. These include 
“employees, local communities and the environment.”212  The first segment of the 
definition touches upon the corporation’s goal to “adhere to moral and ethical norms 
and make a positive impact on society”213. The second segment speaks about the 
company’s responsibility not only to its shareholders, but to everyone who is 
impacted by its operations, which is often in connection with the company’s 
“contribution to economic and environmental sustainability”214. The parameters of 
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what comprises good CSR are what is needed in regulating multinationals, as well as 
PMSCs.  
2. Compliance and Law 
Corporate social responsibility has often been seen as “voluntary actions” that are 
done by corporations and are “beyond what is required by law”215. This then lead to a 
belief that corporate social responsibility was guided by private actors, and that it 
functions “beyond regulation.”216 This also stems from the fact that the push for CSR 
in developed economies, has usually come from the market, mainly from investors, 
consumers and civil society organizations
217
. This being said, a good CSR record can 
provide a corporation with a leg up on the competition.  This also means that the 
government’s involvement in CSR is based around its “core legislative and 
enforcement function”218. In reality many segments of CSR like labor rights and 
environmental protection have become “the subject of independent legal obligations 
in most jurisdictions”219. 
It is a common belief, however, that the separation between “soft law”, being 
voluntary actions, and “hard law”, being “enforceable legal mandates” 220 , is not 
distinct and cannot be the way that corporate social responsibility is identified
221
. For 
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example, Virginia Ho points out that “legal compliance is widely recognized as a 
foundational element of CSR” 222 .  An example of this is found by looking at 
ISO26000:2010, which is a standard created by ninety-nine countries that comprise 
the International Organization for Standardization. ISO26000:2010 states that CSR’s 
definition should include “legal compliance and ‘respect for the rule of law’”223. 
Another example is the CSR pyramid that was developed by Archie Carroll. In this 
pyramid, the base layer, the very foundation of the pyramid is law. Aspects such as 
“corporate philanthropy, ethical and moral dimensions, and the internalization of CSR 
strategy into firm operations” are all near the top of the pyramid, exemplifying the 
importance of the law in CSR
224
. Furthermore, there are enforcement mechanisms that 
split the division between voluntary and mandatory rules. As Virginia Ho puts it “both 
legal obligations and CSR commitments that go beyond regulation can be enforced” 
by these mechanisms that are found in the divide
225
. One example of this is the 
enforcement of corporations “voluntary CSR commitments” by “NGO’s” and 
“consumer activism”, which not only regulate in the present, but can also “influence 
the content of future regulation as well.”226 
It seems also that CSR and the law are “intertwined and mutually influencing”227. As 
Virginia Ho states it, governmental “regulation, policymaking, standard setting” have 
an effect on the voluntary choice to promote and use better business practices, beyond 
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that of the “legal rules”228. Once governments start to set CSR policies, and those 
policies become a part of their “legislative and regulatory functions” the line between 
CSR and the law begins to become blurred
229
. The European council, however, 
determined that the creation of “positive law and related regulations” in fact do serve 
a purpose, which is to create a base upon “which voluntary CSR initiatives may 
build.”230 Unfortunately, there are limits to the way in which these interact. Simply 
shifting focus from the “legislative process…to the enforcement of enacted laws and 
regulations” can create limits and problems 231 . With the increase of globalism, 
multinational corporations, culture and the increased ability to quickly exchange 
information, the limits have become more and more blatant
232
. 
 In regards to domestic regulation, governments have tried a variety of regulatory 
options to try to work around these limits. One of the strategies has been to switch 
from a “command-and-control, penalty-based regulation” to a mix of different 
strategies, which include an emphasis on “voluntary and quasi-voluntary strategies”, 
which takes the place of the threat of consequences, which is believed can influence 
CSR operations in a positive manner
233
. For example, these strategies include 
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“penalty waivers for self-disclosure of violations…and financial incentives for firms 
who implement voluntary internal compliance systems.” 234The most direct role a 
government can play in the application of CSR is partnering. Partnering can include 
“direct government collaboration with companies on specific projects”, which is a 
public-private partnership. Another collaboration is the state’s support and 
participation in efforts to promote CSR by international organizations, as well as 
“state-mediated dialogue around CSR involving companies and other 
stakeholders.”235  Virginia Ho makes an important observation, by saying that the 
interaction between governments and corporations is “bidirectional” meaning that 
“both contribute to evolving practices and policies.”236 Governments can work with 
civil society groups to create joint working groups that determine the design, 
implementation, and monitoring of CSR programs
237
.  Governments also can mandate 
CSR through “legislation and regulatory enforcement.”238 This can be done through 
“mandatory sustainability reporting” or through “standards for the corporate codes of 
conduct that may reach beyond legal compliance.”239The European Commission has 
stated that the “top down” system of regulation plays an important part in “creating an 
environment more conducive to enterprises voluntarily meeting their social 
responsibility.”240 
 How does this relate to PMSCs? First and foremost, PMSCs, functioning as 
multinationals, may find a demand from the market for CSR. On the other hand, the 
market may not have such a demand. However, due to the violations and scandals that 
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have appeared in the past, many in the market may want a good record of CSR, in 
order to prevent bad publicity. 
 
D. U.S. Multinational Regulations 
While not as focused on CSR as other countries
241, America has developed “various 
cooperative enforcement tools that facilitate voluntary compliance with regulatory 
mandates.”242 One of the ways they do this is by creating examples of CSR when the 
government functions as a market player. For example, the “green government 
procurement standards” have been adopted by Massachusetts and California among 
other U.S. states
243
. Another advantage the United States has is a long history of 
“public-private collaboration” which helps create a system of compliance and 
responsibility among the corporate elements of American society
244
. Federal bodies, 
such as the Department of Commerce, the Department of State and the Department of 
energy have “award and training programs” which help create a sense of CSR 
awareness.  Federal programs also create awareness and interest in CSR
245
. The 
“federal income-tax deduction for charitable contributions state constituency statutes, 
and the creation of new stakeholder-focused business forms in some states” help 
create awareness and interest in CSR within the private-sector
246
. 
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1. Monitoring and the Corrupt Practices Act 
Some federal regulations appear and help to monitor MNCs and their CSR. For 
example, the disclosure obligations, required by the federal securities regulation 
create transparency from some firms
247
. The United States also has other acts and 
regulations that are intertwined with CSR. One of the most important of these is the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. The FCPS, made in 1977, makes it illegal for “certain 
classes of persons and entities to make payments to foreign government officials to 
assist in obtaining or retaining business.”248 It specifically speaks about using the 
“instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly” and knowingly using money to 
“induce the foreign official to do or omit to do an act in violation of his or her lawful 
duty.”249 And on top of all of that the act also makes it necessary “for companies 
whose securities are listed in the United States to meet its accounting provisions.”250 
This act provides a great example of a government regulating its corporations even if 
they are abroad. If nothing else it is a valid and possibly successful attempt at keeping 
corporations in line in regards to corruption. 
 
2. Standards and laws 
To build a regulatory agenda, however, there must be a system by which standards of 
regulation are determined. Sources of these standards, while not a fully “embracing 
generalization”, regulation, and standards of regulation, are often based on “formal, 
mandatory sources of regulation such as national laws, administrative rules, and 
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binding international agreements.”251 In the case of Corporate social responsibility, 
these sources tend to be “non-binding voluntary codes or declarations.” 252  Some 
sources, however, are legally binding if they are a convention on a specified issue
253
. 
While most of the CSR sources are considered “soft law”254, “soft law” can become 
“hard law” in the future255. For example, the “emergent new standards of customary 
international law” are an observed transformation from “soft” to “hard” law. 256 
Corporate Social Responsibility, while not necessarily a “hard law” system of 
regulation, has influence and force over multinationals, as well as future 
regulations
257
. CSR in a way can be seen as the most influential system of regulating 
multinationals due to the incentives that it provides. It is a system that facilitates a 
voluntary support and involvement
258 , which is more important than “hard law 
regulation” in many ways. In creating a system by which multinationals choose to 
follow CSR voluntarily, it can be taken as convincing them that it is in their best 
interest and there is an advantage to be gained from the use of CSR. In a sense it 
presents a “win win”, allowing both corporations and the community to benefit from 
the use and observance of CSR. Also, if corporations feel CSR functions in their best 
interests, they may hesitate more to violate it, because they will lose something, 
caused by their violation. 
 
If a corporation can break an international law, and the only result is a fine, or a public 
scandal, they may feel it is worth it to violate the norm. However, if the corporation 
has something at stake in their observance of CSR, and they have to make the 
decision of whether or not to violate international law, they may determine it is in 
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their best interest to simply observe international law and reap the rewards of their 
CSR incentives. On top of that, with the CSR incentives added, the corporation stands 
to lose those incentives, as well as face a scandal and international justice if they are 
caught in violation of international law. This in essence adds another level of loss to 
the corporation, if they decide to violate international law, or human rights law. 
49 
 
V. MNC regulation and PMSCs 
 
Understanding the ways in which multinationals are regulated under international law, 
it is plausible to consider regulating PMSC’s under that category. While the regulation 
of multinationals is not perfect, it is at least existent and has multiple ways of creating 
both voluntary and mandated observance of international norms and customs. The 
regulatory system of corporations may not be the “glass slipper” when it comes to 
PMSC’s, but it would seem that it is a possible solution. 
PMSC’s are corporations. They run as businesses and the goal of business and 
corporations, no matter what service or product they provide, or where they are 
located, is profit
259
. As stated earlier, corporate scandal may not always hurt the profit 
making ability of a business, however, many corporations will still try to avoid a 
scandal. Realistically speaking, the international system can, and possibly should 
view PMSC’s as businesses that render a service. It has been mentioned, multiple 
times, that military contractors are not necessarily hired for combat functions
260
. This 
means that when analyzing what system of regulation would fit, we need to take into 
consideration the multitude of services they provide. 
 The military services market seems to be leaning toward the direction of 
global corporations. Even though until the mid 90’s there were no “truly global 
companies”, it seems to be changing261. The industry itself is expanding and including 
a wider array of services that can be provided
262
. The market demand has caused 
PMSCs to follow the “standard business techniques for market engineering used by 
other types of firms”263. For example, many PMSC firms are either partnering with 
others, or buying smaller firms. The acquisition of smaller firms gives the larger 
corporation access to the niche markets and technological specialization that these 
smaller firms possessed. This strategy allows the larger firms to compete on a global 
scale, using “brand marketing and sub specialization.” Due to “complex security 
situations”, “broader-based firms” offer a larger array of services which allows these 
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companies to increase their market share more rapidly. This is due to the capital they 
already contain, as well as the brand recognition through their records. 
264
 
 An example used by P.W. Singer is that of Defense Services Limited. DSL 
hired primarily ex-SAS personnel, being that they were a British company. They 
offered security training and consultation to multinational corporations stationed in 
areas of conflict, and even guarded embassies.
265
 DSL was bought by Armor 
Holdings, which was an American company that originally was in the body armor 
industry. Armor holdings did this in order to “build up its ‘risk management 
services’”, and used a “growth through acquisitions-strategy.” Armor Holdings has 
also acquired twenty other companies, and now has a new set of “military-related 
services” including mine clearing and intelligence.266 
Armor Holdings is also an example of a progressive firm which does more than 
“military-related services”. With the expansion of technology, and the internet 
relatively unregulated and as singer puts it “weakly controlled by governments”, 
Armor Holdings found a fresh market. To build their “virtual security” support, Armor 
Holdings has bought both IBNet and NTI, both in the internet security business.
267
 
With the exponential growth of cyber threats, the investment in cyber security was a 
great business decision that could hugely benefit Armor Holdings in the future.
268
 
There are market niches to be had in this business, and while many corporations are 
expanding their ownership and expertise to envelop other aspects of the “military-
related services”269270, some companies prefer to stick to their specialty271. This comes 
from a concern regarding reputation, which, in this line of work, has the ability to cut 
both ways
272
. For example, many firms involved in demining operations, while they 
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“recruit many of the same ex-military personnel as larger, more diversified firms”273, 
are considered to be doing humanitarian work. Demining is viewed as a more 
acceptable operation than combat training or consulting due to the fact that it centers 
on “weapons’ removal, rather than use.”274 To prevent their humanitarian oriented 
clientele from leaving for another firm, demining corporations often try their best to 
“disassociate” themselves and their operations from the other PMSCs and the 
“mercenary label”275. However, with more diversified corporations getting a foothold 
in the demining field, it will be interesting to see if these corporations disassociation 
from the rest of the firms make a difference in their success. 
276
 
On the other hand, as stated earlier, some clientele prefer the “more aggressive, 
smaller firms that can cut informal deals that bigger transnational firms cannot.”277 
These firms care less for their reputation, and can utilize the “barter system of 
payment that larger firms with scrutinized accounting practices would not be able to 
employ”278. These firms fill a specific market niche279, which more well-known and 
highly regarded firms cannot or are not willing to fill. 
There is a third market segment, which is comprised of firms that “have their cake and 
try to eat it too”. These firms try to fill the above two market segments, by having a 
“central global brand”, but when they enter new local markets, they “rapidly spawn 
new firms” to “take advantage of the benefits of such smaller organizations.”280 
Executive Outcomes serves as an excellent example. Right after deployment into a 
country Executive Outcomes would “create a network of smaller local firms.” 281 
Former employees would run the businesses which could be anything from “security 
protection to airlift”. Some firms even moved out of the military services industry and 
entered into things like telecommunications and vacation resorts.
282
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There are many advantages to this form of corporate structure. These “stay-behind” 
firms create a “marriage of local specialization and transnational branding”. This in 
turn creates a “flexible network, loosely linking each new market into an overall 
corporate structure.”283 Structures such as these provide advantages such as reducing 
the regulatory capacity of domestic monitors, in the firm’s central country, which is 
already limited to begin with
284. This also allows the firm to “pack up and move” 
whenever it needs “surge capacity for larger operations in one spot”.285 
There is competition in these markets, however, and in less developed countries, 
PMSC’s have begun to emerge. For example, demining firms in Africa are now in 
operation, and take business from the larger richer companies.
286
 The market can also 
be influenced by factors that create independent scenarios. For example, many firms 
based in an area ravaged by war could actually have an advantage, comparatively, 
because the war affects labor pricing and experience.
287
 These firms can also, 
generally, “provide relatively inexpensive military services that may be able to 
undercut established Western Firms.”288 This provides evidence that in the future of 
the industry, clients will have a broad spectrum of services to choose from, in the 
military services field.
289
 Lower pricing will battle with higher technological options, 
and “developing-region” PMSCs will compete with “Western-based firms” 290 . 
According to Singer, it is likely that the most successful PMSCs will be those that 
“move toward product integration” instead of focusing on lower prices or 
technological specialties. In other words, success will come from the “best balance” 
of pricing and quality.
291
 
There is another avenue that may be taken. Smaller firms may be bought and 
absorbed before they truly take off, in order to reduce competition. As Singer 
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mentions, this specific “market seems to have a tendency toward consolidation”. 
Larger corporations with more money will have the ability to make grand offers that 
smaller firms may find hard to refuse.
292
 This prevents the smaller firms from 
threatening the larger firms competitively, and can give the larger firms a new 
foothold in the market. 
 
A. Three phases of operation 
Using Kristen Huskey’s three phase model in combination with the current MNC 
regulatory system, it is possible to imagine an alternative way to regulate PMSC’s, 
assuming the international system views them as multinational corporations. By 
attaching different regulatory demands and incentives to each of the three phases, the 
operations of a PMSC and its personnel can more accurately be regulated, and held 
accountable. Each phase of operation has specific differences that make it difficult to 
find a specific regulatory system that fits. By using multiple regulatory options from 
the multinational spectrum, in essence the international system could, metaphorically, 
build a glove to fit the hand instead of trying to fit existing gloves to the hand. An 
example is that of medieval armor, knights often had the armor made specifically for 
them, made to fit their body only, allowing them better movement and comfort. 
However, if one purchased armor that was not fitted to their body, it would not move 
as easily, or be as comfortable. The raw materials of the armor are the same, just as 
the regulatory raw materials are present. Fitting the regulation to the field is like 
fitting the armor to the person, things must be shaped to align correctly. 
Shaping the regulation to fit the situation will never yield a perfect solution; there will 
always be fluctuations and different situations that don’t fall within the regulatory 
framework. However, using the three phase model may provide enough variety, 
allowing differing situations to be covered and understood. In other words, the 
distinction between each of the three phases creates a new regulatory umbrella that 
can be used to cover a specific situation. 
In the first phase of regulation, the Contracting Phase, Huskey seems to give the 
power to the hiring state.
293
 
294
 In effect the hiring state is given some responsibility in 
regards to who they hire and why. If regulatory bodies were indeed to put the three 
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phase theory into effect, then the responsibility in contracting would be completely on 
the hiring state. This is an important example of how the three phases can clarify 
accountability in the case of violations. In regards to the contract, the responsibility, 
and accountability can be directly traced to the hiring state. The contract contains the 
responsibilities and duties of the PMSC personnel.
295
 Therefore, the hired personnel 
cannot argue that they were given orders that they contractually had to follow. If the 
order falls outside of their contractual responsibilities, then, theoretically, they are 
accountable for performing the action. 
One way of viewing the contractual relationship between PMSCs and a national 
military, is to see it as an international consortium. Muchlinski defines this as “an 
organization which is created when two or more companies co-operate so as to act as 
a single entity for a specific and limited purpose.”296 In the case of PMSC and their 
relationship to national militaries, there is a “limited purpose” in that they are “co-
operating” during war or peace time operations, for specific reasons. Contractually, 
there can also be Public Private Partnerships, specifically when a state uses the 
services of a “foreign private contractor”. As stated earlier, in this situation the State 
being the larger of the two groups, provides the financing and technology, and the 
local party that has been hired will provide the “workforce and supporting 
infrastructure”.297 If there is indeed a Public Private Partnership, this allows the state 
to remain in “strategic control” of the project. 298  
Using the regulatory framework for multinationals, it is easier to see who is 
accountable for what in the contractual phase. One of the other benefits of the 
contractual phase is that regulation can also come from the home state
299
, the state in 
which the PMSC is based. Potentially the home state and the contracting state can be 
one in the same, giving them twice the regulatory power. According to Huskey, the 
home state has the ability to suspend and/or take away the licenses of said 
corporations.
300
 This keeps business inactive and can even close down a corporation. 
Given that the most impactful and the principal jurisdictional level for multinationals 
is the home state, extraterritoriality becomes a problem. However, with the three 
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phase argument, the nation state has the regulatory power, responsibility, and 
accountability for the contracting phase.
301
 
302
 With the home state’s influence over 
the contracting phase, it can prove that there was no “direction and control”303 during 
a violation, and it can be used as evidence to absolve the state of any responsibility. 
The second phase, called the in-the-field phase, is where regulation truly matters. In 
this phase the potential for violations and criminal acts becomes more apparent, and 
therefore should be regulated more acutely. Unfortunately, this is also the phase in 
which regulation is hardest to enact and enforce. The main problem with national 
regulation is that the multinational, in this case the PMSC, operates across the limits 
of national jurisdiction. This results in a “mismatch between…the managerial and 
operational reach of the firm and…the jurisdictional reach of the state that seeks to 
regulate”304. What the state may choose to do, is “extend the operation of its laws 
outside its territorial jurisdiction,” resulting in a case where it applies the “laws 
extraterritorially”305. There could also be a prescription of laws that are applicable to 
the whole of multinational groups. This would be done regardless of the 
multinationals presence in a foreign country.
306
 This is important for multiple reasons 
that extend beyond the image of the state to the international community. 
 
Muchlinski provides a scenario that works for multinationals and PMSCs equally. 
Muchlinski states that a home state may want to prevent its multinational “from 
trading with potential enemy powers.”307 PMSCs should also be regulated in the same 
manner to prevent them from being hired by enemies or potential enemies of their 
home states. Due to the nationality of the parent corporation, and the control it has 
over its subsidiaries, this can be done.
308
 This may also happen in the contracting 
phase as well, however, to control the subsidiaries; it has to be done while they are in 
action. A subsidiary could easily deceive the home country or even its parent 
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company, and actively operate under the direction of a foreign government. By using 
the nationality principle, the legal nationalities of the subsidiaries are overcome by the 
law of the home state of the parent company
309
. What this entails is, the home state 
imposing legal duties on the parent company
310
. To control the subsidiaries, the parent 
company must be ordered to “direct the acts of the subsidiary in the required 
manner.”311 Basically, a state wants to ensure that the “overseas unit of the MNE acts 
in accordance with the law that governs the activities of the unit present within the 
regulating state.”312 
Muchlinski has determined that the extraterritorial application of regulation is usually 
done by stronger states. The reason this is, is because there can be conflict caused by 
the imposition of laws on a multinational operating on foreign soil. The host state may 
see it as a violation of their sovereignty.
313
 The exercising of jurisdiction across 
borders, according to Muchlinski, is based on the “regulating state’s power and 
confidence in the validity…of its policies.”314 In the specific case of PMSC personnel, 
this could also be seen. For example, if a European PMSC was hired to guard a 
compound in Africa, and was later ordered to fight rebels, the European home state 
could intervene to prevent this from happening. The host country may be upset that 
the home state’s government stopped their operations, yet on an international scale, 
the operations of the PMSC personnel bordered dangerously on mercenary activity, 
and would put these personnel in a different level of danger. The European state 
would be extremely confident in their decision, even if the African country disagreed, 
and considered it a violation of their sovereignty. 
Muchlinski also makes a point to state that the host country, especially if they are a 
weaker or less developed state tends to be more accepting of the extraterritorial 
regulation.
315
 While they may be upset with the violation of their sovereignty, or the 
jurisdictional dominance, however, they may accept it as “the price to be paid for 
foreign aid and investment.”316 This is when a subsidiary of a PMSC or the PMSC 
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itself is operating in or for a host state. A PMSC may also be hired by a state other 
than its home state, and be used in a third state. In this case the state that hires the 
PMSC is labeled as the hiring state, while the state it is operating in is the host state. 
In a scenario where a home state, or a hiring state send their PMSC personnel into 
foreign territory, most likely the state in which they are deployed, the host state, will 
not object to regulation by the home or hiring state.   
According to different cases in international law), it seems that extraterritorial 
regulation, at least in some scenarios can and does happen
317 . However, “civil 
regulation”, a system by which informal regulation is enacted through NGOs318, may 
be overlooked in the global order. This system of regulation involves “both 
cooperative approaches, under which NGOs and MNEs act in partnership to 
further…social responsibility goals”319 . While many PMSCs may not want to be 
involved with NGOs, others may. For example, many demining firms may want to 
organize with NGOs in order to exemplify their difference from other PMSCs. There 
are also more critical avenues that can be taken, in a partnership between PMSCs, or 
multinationals in general, and NGOs. Assuming PMSCs and MNCs have an ultimate 
goal of profit, they can be hurt by bad publicity. NGOs in partnership with other 
multinationals can highlight “corporate malpractice” and “monitor compliance with 
voluntary and/or mandatory standards”320. While this may seem to have little impact, 
it has the potential to whip PMSCs into shape. Bad publicity can always hurt the 
company, and if there is an international group, such as an NGO, watching them 
closely, then they may think twice before breaking the rules. 
The third phase, in Huskey’s model, is the “post-conduct phase.” At this point, it is 
assumed that PMSC personnel have harmed someone, or violated an international 
norm, or law. First and foremost, if one of three core segments of international 
criminal law, namely genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes, is violated, 
any businesses or individuals can be held liable
321
. For example, after world war two, 
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officials of German corporations were held liable for international crimes that were 
“connected to active participation in the Nazi regime”. 322 The second strategy to hold 
corporations liable is to seek redress for damages through a lawsuit
323
. The lawsuit 
does not necessarily have to be filed in the home country of a corporation, but can be 
filed in a country where a corporation’s assets are located324. If nothing else, the 
lawsuit can bring attention to the violation and may change popular opinion of the 
business. 
The redress phase, while important to exemplify the consequences of a 
violation, is not as important as the other two phases for a simple reason; the violation 
has already occurred. While redress and punishment are important, they are reactions 
to the violation, not a solution or a preventative measure. As mentioned earlier, 
Huskey believes  what needs to be determined in this situation is “applicable law or 
legal doctrines to determine who is accountable/liable (for example, PMSC, 
individual, state) for the relevant conduct, and to whom; applicable criminal laws and 
mechanisms, and which state or international body has responsibility to enforce such 
laws...”325. However, as also stated earlier, in regards to post conduct situations, “IHL 
is mostly silent.” 326In comparison to domestic law, murderers are punished for their 
crimes, yet people still choose to murder, even knowing the punishment that could 
await them. Why would this be any different for international violations, especially if 
consequences are not as dire? In summation, these violations need to be prevented, 
not reacted to. The third phase, the “post-conduct” phase is important, but once that 
phase has been entered, the violation has already happened, and it is too late. 
 
B. Corporate entity 
One thing that should be considered an advantage, however, of labeling PMSCs 
multinational corporations, is the legal liability a corporation may have on the 
international scale. Corporations are “granted existence by the state” but are 
considered a “legal person” under the law327. This means that multinationals can be 
sued, and held accountable for violations of international law. Theoretically, this may 
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be advantageous, in so far as if a corporation, as a legal entity, is brought before an 
international court for violations it has committed, and is sued, the entire corporation 
loses that profit. This may have more impact on future operations; the reason being, it 
hurts profit. For example, if one person in a PMSC violates international humanitarian 
or human rights law, that person may be held accountable in the international justice 
system, and the corporation may suffer some bad publicity. However, if the 
corporation itself is brought to court and sued for a large sum, it affects everyone in 
the corporation. As Muchlinski states, a MNCs “only social responsibility is to make 
profits...”328. Assuming the goal of PMSCs is to make money, the loss of profit would 
matter more than the loss of an employee, and the subsequent scandal following a 
violation. Potentially, this could create a scenario where employees are more closely 
monitored and self-regulation is taken seriously in order to prevent a loss of profit. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
PMSCs are not categorized under international law, causing a loophole in 
regulation.
329
 
330
Similarly, there are issues in regulating multinational corporations. 
There are however, systems of authority and control that can be implemented to 
regulate multinationals. A gap in regulation under international law is always 
dangerous and should be closed. There are many theories regarding the regulation of 
PMSCs, one of which is placing them in an official category and thereby applying the 
regulatory bodies and rules to these PMSCs. One of the categories that PMSCs can fit 
is that of a MNC or a multinational corporation.
331
 This category is advantageous 
because PMSCs are in essence businesses that operate across national boundaries. 
 
However, the advantages also include other categories. For example, another category 
some have placed PMSCs in is the ‘mercenary’ category.332 While the legal definition 
of a mercenary is extremely hard to meet, and easy to avoid as a label
333
, mercenaries 
are, in essence, focused on profit.
334
 This is the same as a corporation which has a 
simple goal of profits. Labeling PMSCs MNCs also means that the drive of the PMSC 
is profit
335
 
336
, meaning that PMSCs can be affected, and regulated in regards to their 
profits, the same as mercenaries. Overall, however, international MNC regulation 
provides a good base to regulate PMSCs. Using Huskey’s three phases of regulation 
in combination with MNC regulation, PMSCs can be more thoroughly regulated, and 
accountability more accurately determined. In addition to regulation, being considered 
corporations may allow a PMSC as an entity to be held accountable for violations. 
The possibilities are there, and while the system has gaps, it seems it could be an 
answer in the future. 
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